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Let’s say that formalism is the (loosely characterized) view that argument
validity (or "umbrella" validity) is at bottom a matter of logical form. Bob Pinto’s
stimulating paper is construed, by its author, as an attack upon formalism.
Formalism itself, however, admits of a variety of formulations, and in this short
commentary I want to articulate my own preferred version of formalism – what I
call generic formalism – and explain why, in spite of his many cogent remarks,
Pinto might consider endorsing this view as well. (Before I begin, I want to
acknowledge that my views on formalism are inspired by, and deeply indebted
to the work of my colleague, David Hitchcock.)
First, we need a notion of logical form. Let’s say that argument A instantiates
logical form F iff F is the result of uniformly replacing one or more nonlogical
terms, occurring within A, with distinct variables. Now, this is perhaps too
crude, but it is simple, and accurate enough for our purposes here today. So,
for example, argument (A)
(A) The person standing next to the prime minister is his sister.
The person standing next to the prime minister is female.
 
instantiates the logical form
 
(F1) The person standing next to X is X’s sister.
The person standing next to X is female.
This definition of logical form has three significant consequences.
(1) Every argument instantiates a number of different logical forms. (A), for




(2) Logical forms, in the liberal sense defined above, allow for both purely
factual and purely abstract content. (F2) is a purely abstract and, we might say,
classical example of logical form. (F1), however, is not a logical form in the
classical sense.
(3) Every argument shares any of its logical forms with countless other
arguments. There are, for example, arguments comparable to (A), which share
form (F1), which are about presidents, architects, scuba divers, and next door
neighbours, rather than prime ministers.
The salient point about logical form, then, is that a logical form captures, or
displays a pattern of reasoning, articulated at some level of abstractness,
shared by many different arguments.
Generic Formalism can now be defined as follows: Every valid argument is
valid in virtue of the fact that it instantiates at least one valid argument form.
(Note that generic formalism itself does not define the notion of validity.) I view
generic formalism as making two implicit claims.
(1) An existential claim to the effect that, for every valid argument, there exists a
corresponding, or underlying valid logical form.
(2) That the existence of this underlying form has explanatory value. For
example, that (A) instantiates the valid logical form (F1) explains why (A) is
valid.
I call this position generic formalism for the reason that the explanation of an
argument’s validity can occur at different levels of specificity or abstractness,
and within different (very loosely defined) "genres" of discourse. Sometimes
the logical form in question is purely formal, composed only of variables and
logical constants, as in the case of modus ponens. Sometimes the form may
incorporate nonlogical terms the meaning of which is crucial to the form’s
validity, as in (F1). And sometimes factual considerations may be relevant to
the form’s validity, as in the case of (F3).
(F3) X littered in a public park in Vancouver last summer.
X broke the law in Vancouver last summer.
For our purposes, generic formalism has one important consequence: No valid
argument is "isolated." That is, identifying an argument as valid, and explaining
wherein its validity consists, commits one to making comparable claims about
an entire class of arguments; namely, all those arguments instantiating the
same form. So, for example, if (A) is valid, then there is a corresponding class
f(A) of valid arguments which are valid for precisely the same reason that (A) is
valid. Logic, as a discipline, moves beyond the particularity of individual
arguments, and seeks to establish interesting general claims of precisely this
sort.
Now, given this (far too lengthy) stage setting, let me close by finally making
two general sets of comments about Bob Pinto’s paper.
(1) Pinto argues at some length that the premise of (A) entails the conclusion
of (A), and that this fact can be understood without appealing to any underlying
logical form (or any meaning postulate). However, my question is (and here I
quote from Pinto): Which approach best "serves the aims of critical practice" --
viewing (A) as a valid argument because its premise entails its conclusion, or
viewing (A) as a valid argument because it instantiates an underlying valid
argument form. Though Pinto himself raises the issue, he says precious little in
this paper about this pivotal question. He admits, of course, that it is a complex
issue, and that there are no conclusive arguments yet on either side of the
debate.
Let me offer two quick arguments in favour of formalism. First, the fact that the
premise of (A) entails the conclusion of (A) does not, in itself, explain why (A) is
a valid argument. Pinto himself acknowledges that entailment is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition of validity. (Keep in mind that we are both
talking about umbrella validity throughout our discussions.) Arguments which
beg the question, for example, are not valid (in the appropriate sense). Pinto of
course notes this exception, and notes that (A) does not beg the question. But
how do we know that there are not other exceptions? (The paradoxes of
entailment come to mind.) And, perhaps more importantly, if there any
exceptions, as there are, then this suggests that entailment alone does not
adequately explain validity. We need to know, at the very least, why certain
entailments support valid arguments, and why certain other entailments do not.
Entailment alone cannot be the whole story.
My second argument rests on a view of logic, hinted at earlier, to the effect that
logic explores (or at least is far more interesting when it explores) general
claims about entire classes of arguments. Whereas Pinto leaves us with the
bare, isolated fact that (A) is valid, formalism explains (A)’s validity in terms of
(A)’s membership in a large class of structurally similar arguments. To my
mind, this better serves the interests of argument criticism in allowing an entire
set of critical comments about (A) to be transferred automatically to all
arguments within the class f(A). Formalism allows for far more potent tools of
argument criticism.
My second very brief comment about Pinto’s paper concerns the green/grue
problem. And all I can say here is that Pinto’s many interesting and intelligent
remarks about this problem only reinforce my perception of formalism as an
interesting and viable ongoing research programme. We may not yet have put
our finger on a logical form which explains the validity of certain classes of
inductive generalizations. However, Pinto certainly appears to be looking for
one (in the extended sense of logical form defined earlier which can
accommodate factual, contextual, and pragmatic matters) , and he also
appears to have come close to finding one with (something like) form (F4)
(F4) N% of Xs in sample S are Y.
S is representative of the population P with respect to all those
properties that affect whether Xs are Y.
N% of Xs in P are Y.
(I add parenthetically that I don’t share Pinto’s worries about (F4) since I
believe we often are in a position, when arguing about green emeralds, for
example, to reasonably believe the second premise.)
Accordingly, Pinto has not only inadvertently kept the formalist programme
alive and kicking, but he has credibly extended that programme into the
domain of inductive generalizations, and I am happy to wish him continued
success in that challenging and very exciting enterprise.
